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I. INTRODUCTION
Voters in Oklahoma are driving ambitious and unprecedented criminal justice 
1
and sentence enhancements for defendants with criminal histories. Oklahoma enacted both 
prison population that has had catastrophic effects, including an unmanageable prison 
population and longer prison sentences than any other state in the US.2
systems through state ballot questions has caused inconsistencies in the law that could 
have dramatic effects. In one example, Oklahoma State Questions 780 and 781 (hereinafter 
SQ780 and SQ781) passed in 2016 created inconsistencies in applying the current state 
drug court statute.3 SQ780 reclassified the crime of drug possession from a felony to a 
misdemeanor, yet the current drug court statute requires a felony conviction for admission 
to drug court. This Comment lays out the background history that led to the passage of 
SQ780 and SQ781 in Part II. 
These criminal justice reform initiatives intended to lower prison populations
reduced the classifications of many low-level felonies, including drug possession, and 
diverted funds to evidence-based addiction treatments. Specifically, SQ780 declassified 
all low-level drug possession charges from felonies to misdemeanors with a maximum 
punishment of one year in jail and/or a one thousand dollar fine.4 SQ781 was dependent 
on the passage of SQ780 this measure required funds saved from incarcerating non-
violent felons to be redistributed into county drug addiction treatment and prevention 
programs. However, the Oklahoma drug court statute requires a felony charge before a 
defendant is eligible for admission to an alternative sentencing drug court.5
 Since the middle of 2017, when SQ780 went into effect, county drug court 
admissions have dropped by eighteen percent compared to previous years.6 See Figure 1
below. 
                                                          
 1. Mark Obbie, Oklahoma Struggles with Its Tough-on-Crime Past, TAKEPART MAG., (Sept. 19, 2016), 
http://www.takepart.com/feature/2016/09/19/violence-and-redemption-oklahoma. 
 2. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, PRISON POL Y
INITIATIVE, at fig.1 (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html. 
 3. State Question No. 780, Initiative Petition No. 404 (as proposed by Okla. Sec y of State, Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/780.pdf [hereinafter SQ780]; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1 71.3. 
 4. SQ780, supra note 3. 
 5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2(A)(4). 
 6. The author requested statewide drug court admissions information from 2010 through 2018 from the 
Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services via a Freedom of Information Request 
(also called an Open Records Request in Oklahoma). E-mail from Jeffrey Dismukes, Dir. of Commc ns, Okla. 
Dep t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., to the author (Jan. 25, 2019, 4:43PM CST) (on file with 
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Figure 1
Herein lies the conundrum: If interpreted plainly, the contrast between SQ780 and 
the Oklahoma drug court statute could cause county drug courts across the state to lose 
their funding, since funding is allocated to each program based on participation. If there 
are not enough people in the programs, the programs will eventually become financially 
unsustainable. It is too soon to tell how impactful the funds being redirected into 
alternative treatments via SQ781 will be in ameliorating this issue. Most likely, those funds 
will not be used to support compulsory county drug courts, but other types of drug abuse 
prevention programs. However, Oklahoma Management and Enterprise Services (OMES) 
has specified that any funding requests for money from the SQ781 fund must flow through 
district attorneys  offices,7 so it is possible that SQ781 money could supplement the 
funding lost from county drug courts, and this Comment cannot discount that possible 
outcome. In the vacuum created by such sweeping criminal justice reforms, uncertainty is 
rampant. In the face of such uncertainty, it is important to examine alternative statutory 
interpretations that can remedy this possible funding shortage. 
In Part III, the Comment examines and applies three models of ballot initiative 
interpretation. When looking at these models and the canons of statutory interpretation, 
the analysis concludes there are three ways to interpret the Drug Court/SQ780 discrepancy: 
(1) the State Questions and the drug court statute may remain as written, but result in a 
dramatically smaller number of eligible drug court defendants; (2) SQ780 and SQ781 
implicitly repeal the drug court statute; or (3) the drug court statute is no longer functional 
prisons and reducing incarceration. 
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Part IV lists recommendations for statutory amendments to the drug court statute, 
because amending the statute is the best available outcome. If the drug court statute and 
the State Questions remain un-
mean
increasingly smaller numbers of eligible defendants into the programs with little disruption 
to practitioners. This can go on until the overhead of the programs exceeds operating funds 
driven by defendant participation, at which point the drug court programs will no longer 
make financial sense. This also leaves drug court programs vulnerable to the whims of 
policy makers and elected leaders who can eliminate the programs with little fanfare by 
following the plain text of the statutes. Conversely, if the state questions implicitly repeal 
the drug court statute, very little structure exists to implement an entirely new scheme of 
treatment and treatment funding across the state being diverted by SQ781, and no 
compulsory court-ordered compliance to utilize such programs currently exists. In ballot 
current laws that contradict the state questions. Under this view, lawmakers must amend 
the drug court statute to reflect the will of the voters and create a statute that rehabilitates 
to reconcile these laws will have longstanding effects on the treatment and adjudication of 
addict populations across the state. 
II. OKLAHOMA S CRIMINAL JUSTICE HISTORY FORCED VOTERS TO TAKE MATTERS INTO 
THEIR OWN HANDS
In 2016, when SQ780 and 781 were passed, Oklahoma had the highest incarceration 
rate in the world.8 SQ780 and SQ781 were passed after forty years of prison growth that 
the legislature repeatedly failed to address.9 Although community sentencing legislation 
passed in 1999 was intended to address this high incarceration rate, compromises to that 
legislation added to continued prison population growth.10 County drug courts can drive 
incarceration due to variant practice standards and high revocation rates,11 but they remain 
a stalwart for treating addicts in the criminal justice system.12 SQ780 and SQ781 
declassified simple drug possession and low-level property crimes from felonies to 
misdemeanors in order to reverse the trend in prison population growth. While they may 
reduce admissions into prison, the changes do 
statute that requires a felony for admission. 
                                                          
 8. Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 2. 
 9. See Linda G. Morrissey & Vicki S. Brandt, Community Sentencing in Oklahoma: Offenders Get a Second 
Chance to Make a First Impression, 36 TULSA L. REV. 767, 768 72 (2001). 
10. Id. at 770. 
 11. Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1462 63 nn.105 08, 
1517 19 nn.310 13 (2000); Eric L. Sevigny, Brian K. Fuleihan & Frank V. Ferdik, Do Drug Courts Reduce the 
Use of Incarceration?: A Meta-Analysis, 41 J. CRIM. JUST. 416, 423 (2013).  
 12. MICHAEL W. FINIGAN, SHANNON M. CAREY & ANTON COX, IMPACT OF A MATURE DRUG COURT OVER 
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A. In 1999, Oklahoma’s Community Sentencing Law Was Passed to Address Swelling 
Prison Populations 
federal statutes 
that introduced mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes and sentence 
enhancements for repeat offenders.13
y heroin.14 As 
these changes to sentencing became law in federal courts, states followed suit. States 
across the nation began to amend criminal statutes to increase sentencing for drug-related 
crimes.15
Oklahoma was among the states that enacted highly punitive, long sentences for drug 
crimes beginning in the early 1970s.16 For example, until SQ780 was passed in 2016, 
Possession with Intent to Distribute Illegal Drugs was punishable by a range of zero years 
to life in prison.17 Drug Trafficking currently carries a sentence of ten years to life as well 
as a $50,000 fine that can apply to each count.18 SQ780 implemented changes to the law 
and 1990s.19 By the late 1990s, legislators realized they needed to curb prison growth, and 
a three-year legislative battle on this topic began in 1997. More liberal legislators who 
called for community sentencing and more flexible parole parameters clashed with more 
conservative legislators who 
strong punishment and sentencing statutes in place.20
Legislators and criminal law experts correctly foresaw prison growth as a drain on 
resources and revenue for the state budget.21 By 1999, the prison population was 
unmanageable: the cost of maintaining prisons was mounting while revenue from a low-
taxed base was waning. Legislators needed to find a way to implement measures that 
would curb prison growth, but still play to a largely conservative base. In addition, they 
22
                                                          
 13. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY: DRUG ARRESTS AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES,
12 (2009), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0309web_1.pdf. 
 14. LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY,
POLICY, AND TRENDS 5 (Oct. 2, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43749.pdf. 
15. Id.
 16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401 (1971). This statute is the drug possession statute. It first went into effect in 
1971. Most states codified large drug possession and distribution statutes with hefty penalties (known as 
Rockefeller drug laws) in response to public outcry about addiction and distribution of drugs. Criminal law 
experts pinpoint this moment as the beginning of an incarceration epidemic in the United States. Brian Mann, 
The Drug Laws That Changed How We Punish, NPR (Feb. 14, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171822608/the-drug-laws-that-changed-how-we-punish. 
17. § 2-401. 
 18. § 2-415 (2018); § 51.1 (2018). 
 19. SQ780, supra note 3. 
 20. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 768 71.
 21. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996, 26 CRIME & JUST.
17, 18 19 (1999). 
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sentencing laws, the Oklahoma Legislature passed a criminal justice reform bill with three 
goals. First was community sentencing [ing] the public in a cost-
effective . . . system that utilizes a broad spectrum of supervised sanctions to treat both the 
criminogenic and social needs of the eligible offender while they remain in the 
23 Across the state, courts were faced with a lack of options between the 
extremes of prison time and probation.24 Community sentencing provided a bridge 
between the two extremes that allowed defendants a second chance to rehabilitate from 
drug addiction. Second, the law required defendants 
25 to serve the first eighty-five percent of their prison sentences with no ability to 
earn additional days off their sentences put plainly, eighty-five percent of the sentence 
was to be served as hard time.26 Crimes in this category eventually became known as 
- 27
be a fatal flaw that would continue to overfill 
prisons for the next nineteen years.28 Third, the law enforced a prison capacity cap stating 
that when prisons were at ninety-five percent capacity, inmates with eligible time credits 
were provided early release.29
The Oklahoma Community Sentencing Act of 1999 authorized ten pilot programs 
for community sentencing and also passed the drug court statute.30 This portion of the bill 
created drug courts in ten counties: Tulsa, Grady, Wagoner, Cherokee, Pontotoc, Hughes, 
Seminole, Rogers, Mayes, and Craig.31 The drug court statute outlines how drug courts 
                                                          
 23. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 767.
24. Id.
    25.   Id. at 763.
 26. Oklahoma Community Sentencing Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 988.1 88.23 (Supp. 2000); Hard time
refers to time that inmates are serving day for day, as opposed to time that can earn them credits for time served 
and potentially lead to early release. 
 27. For example, an exceprt of the statute reads:  
Persons convicted of: [f]irst degree murder as defined in Section 701.9 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes]; . . . [r]obbery with a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 801 of [Title 21 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes]; . . . [f]irst degree rape as provided in Section . . . 1115 of [Title 21 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes]; . . . [f]irst degree arson as defined in Section 1401 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes]; . . . [f]irst degree burglary as provided in Section 1436 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes]; . . . [b]ombing as defined in Section 1767.1 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [a]ny 
crime against a child provided for in Section 843.5 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [f]orcible 
sodomy as defined in Section 888 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [c]hild pornography as 
defined in Section 1021.2 or 1021.3 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [c]hild prostitution as 
defined in Section 1030 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [l]ewd molestation of a child as 
defined in Section 1123 of [the Oklahoma Statues] . . . shall be required to serve not less than eighty-
five percent (85%) of any sentence of imprisonment imposed by the judicial system prior to becoming 
eligible for consideration for parole. Persons convicted of these offenses shall not be eligible for 
earned credits or any other type of credits which have the effect of reducing the length of the sentence 
to less than eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.  
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 13.1 (1999). 
 28. Ryan Gentzler, What’s Driving Oklahoma’s Prison Population Growth?, OKLA. POL Y INST. (Feb. 9, 
2016), https://okpolicy.org/whats-driving-prison-population-growth/. 
 29. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 770. 
 30. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1 471.3 (2014). 
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several restrictions that limit eligibility of defendants.32 The law was intended to provide 
non-violent drug offenders an alternative that was more invasive than parole and less 
detrimental than prison. 
The drug court statute, a piece of the Community Sentencing Act, was written not 
only to preclude any offender who had committed an eighty-five percent crime, but went 
a step further and screened out several more violent offenses that were not classified as 
eighty-five percent crimes at the time.33 The district attorney could waive this restriction 
on admissibility, as long as the crime was not an eighty-five percent crime. The statute 
then required that the offender be assessed using a screening process to determine his/her 
probability of reoffending and overall criminality risk to the community. The assessment 
34 The ideal 
criminality score for a drug court participant is moderate research showed that those 
lower on the scale were likely to see an increase in criminality score if entered into the 
program. Those higher on the scale needed a stronger intervention like prison.35
The Community Sentencing Act requires offenders to plead guilty, be found guilty, 
or enter a nolo contendere plea in order to access an alternative community sentencing 
option. The Act gives the court discretion over which rehabilitative resources the offender 
may access. These resources largely depend on the area where the court is located urban 
or rural. Once in a community-sentencing program, forty to seventy percent of the 
meetings, drug tests, job training, therapy, or in-patient treatment. If an offender does not 
comply with the program guidelines, there is a wide range of sanctions available to the 
court including fines, reduction in program levels (effectively extending the time in the 
program), and jail time. If the offender completes the sentencing program successfully, 
their conviction is discharged or dismissed with prejudice.36
Over the next eighteen years, community sentencing took root in Oklahoma and 
became a large part of how the criminal justice system treats addiction, mental health, and 
domestic violence.37 Tulsa County, for example, has mental health court, a domestic 
violence court, and a drug court in addition to a few privately-funded alternative 
sentencing programs.38 However, some rural counties may only offer drug court as an 
alternative to incarceration and some may have a mix of the above alternative courts. Since 
                                                          
 32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1 71.3 (2014). 
 33. § 471.1(c) (1997). 
 34. § 471.2 (1997). 
 35. 1 NAT L ASSOC. OF DRUG COURT PROF LS, ADULT DRUG COURT BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS 5 (2013), 
https://www.nadcp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Adult-Drug-Court-Best-Practice-Standards-Volume-I-
Text-Revision-December-2018-1.pdf. 
 36. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 774 80. 
 37. For the purposes of this note, the analysis focuses on county drug courts, permitted by OKLA. STAT. tit. 
22, §§ 471.1 71.3 (2014), and thus largely does not discuss mental health courts, domestic violence courts, or 
privately funded alternative sentencing options. 
 38. Women in Recovery is a women s diversionary program that is privately funded by Family and Children s
Services in Tulsa. It is a trauma-informed addiction treatment and job readiness program. Women in Recovery,
FAMILY & CHILDREN S SERV S. OF OKLA.,  https://www.fcsok.org/services/women-in-recovery/ (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2018). First Step is a Tulsa County men s diversionary program funded by grants and headed by former 
criminal judge, William Kellough. FIRST STEP MALE DIVERSION PROGRAM, http://1ststepmdp.com/ (last visited 





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 94 Side B      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
MCCARTY, C - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2020 4:11 PM 
542 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:535 
1999, drug courts have spread from the ten pilot programs to seventy-three of the seventy-
seven counties across Oklahoma. The drug court statute, a subset of the Community 
Sentencing Act, has been amended three times, once in 2008 to add misdemeanor drug 
courts, again in 2009 to allow for juvenile drug court programs, and finally in 2016 to 
allow for a new form of mental health and substance abuse evaluation.39
B. Despite the Imposition of Community Sentencing, by 2016 Oklahoma Ranked Number 
One in the World for Incarceration 
Even after eighteen years of community sentencing, Oklahoma still struggles with 
over-capacity prisons and the voters have yet to see meaningful legislative action to reduce 
prison populations. Though they were intentionally limited to only eleven crimes at their 
inception, the eighty-five percent crimes have grown to twenty-two total crimes as part of 
an effort to increase punitive measures toward violent criminals.40 This has led to an 
overpopulated prison system that will take years to correct. 
In 2016, Oklahoma also topped the list of states for number of incarcerated 
women.41 Per capita, there were more females serving prison time in Oklahoma than in 
any other state. This statistic is startling because of research that shows the impact 
incarcerating women has on families and communities as a whole. Incarcerating a parent 
leaves their children three times more likely to become criminal-justice-involved in their 
lifetime.42 Further, Oklahoma incarcerated more citizens per capita than Cuba, China, and 
Russia.43 Oklahoma was also number one for overall incarceration or criminal justice 
supervision, with over 36,900 individuals incarcerated and 28,000 on probation.44
Oklahoma incarcerated 1,079 individuals per 100,000 citizens, overtaking Louisiana 
which previously held the number-one seat in incarceration at 1,057 per 100,000.45
                                                          
 39. Oklahoma Drug Court Act, Laws 1997, SB 645, c. 359, § 2 (Amended by Laws 2008, HB 2522, c. 37, § 
1, eff. November 1, 2008; Amended by Laws 2009, HB 2029, c. 234, § 131, emerg. eff. May 21, 2009; Amended 
by Laws 2016, HB 2753, c. 222, § 1, eff. November 1, 2016). 
 40. Today s eighty-five percent crimes in Oklahoma include: First degree murder as defined in OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 701.7; Second degree murder as defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.8; Manslaughter in the first 
degree as defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 711; Poisoning with intent to kill as defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 
§ 651; Shooting with intent to kill, as provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 652; Assault with intent to kill as 
provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 653; Conjoint robbery as defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 800; Robbery 
with a dangerous weapon as defined in Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 801; First degree robbery as defined in OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 797; First degree rape as provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1111, 1114, 1115; First degree arson 
as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1401; First degree burglary as provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1436; 
Bombing as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1767.1; Any crime against a child provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 
21, § 843.5; Forcible sodomy as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 888; Child pornography or aggravated child 
pornography as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1021.2, 1021.3, 1024.1, 1024.2, 1040.12a; Child prostitution 
as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1030; Lewd molestation of a child as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1123; 
Abuse of a vulnerable adult, as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 10-103; Aggravated trafficking as provided 
for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-41(C); and Human trafficking as provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748. 
 41. Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 2, at fig.1. 
 42. JAMES M. CONWAY & EDWARD T. JONES, SEVEN OUT OF TEN? NOT EVEN CLOSE: REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS BECOMING JUSTICE-INVOLVED, INST. FOR 
MUN. & REG L POL Y AT CENT. CONN. ST. U. 5 (2015), 
https://www.ccsu.edu/imrp/Publicatons/Files/CIP_Seven_Out_of_Ten_Not_Even_Close.pdf. 
43. Id.
 44. Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 2, at fig.1. 
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In contrast to Oklahoma, Louisiana has undertaken meaningful criminal justice 
reform. In 2017, Louisiana passed the Justice Reinvestment Initiative. The bill focused on 
reducing the number of non-violent criminals in prison, strengthening community 
supervision and reinvesting savings into recidivism reduction and crime victim support. 
Since its passage, Louisiana reports a twenty-one percent reduction in drug offenders 
entering prison, and a twenty percent decrease in property crime offenders.46 Unlike 
(until 2016) have done little to impact the overall 
number of incarcerated individuals. In fact, after SQ780 and SQ781 went into effect, 
prison admissions rose.47 This is surprising because SQ780 and SQ781 are modeled off 
of progressive and effective criminal justice reforms, like those taking place in Louisiana. 
As of the date of publication, Louisiana has returned to the number one incarcerator in the 
world, however the state has experienced a downturn in prison admissions since 
implementing reforms.48
One driver of incarceration in Oklahoma is the misuse of drug courts. Many 
defendants who plea into drug court are contra-indicated their addiction behaviors and 
criminality indicators are not a fit with an alternative sentencing drug court.49 Contra-
indi
continued drug use or other infractions. In the end, after failing drug court, many of these 
defendants get longer prison sentences than a jury would have handed down at trial.50
Further, the current drug court statute contains many restrictions precluding good 
candidates from admission into drug court programs.51 The current drug court statute 
requires that the district attorney offer defendants drug court. Ultimately this restriction 
leads the district attorney 
even when the court-administered drug and alcohol assessment indicates a defendant may 
be a good fit.52 In addition, any prior violent felony within the past ten years precludes a 
defendant from drug court.53 All violent felonies as controlling charges54 are precluded 
except domestic violence offenders who can be pled into statutory domestic violence 
courts.55 56 and this restriction is keeping 
                                                          
 46. LA. DEP T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRS. & LA. COMM N ON L. ENF T, LOUISIANA S JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT REFORMS FIRST ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 24 (June 2018), 
http://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/JRI/LA_JRI_Annual_Report_FINAL.PDF. 
 47. OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM & FWD.US, OKLAHOMA S ONGOING IMPRISONMENT 
CRISIS (2018), https://www.fwd.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/oklahoma_data_update_2018.pdf. 
    48. Jake Horowitz & Elizabeth Compa, Louisiana Continues Efforts to Protect Public Safety and Reform 
Justice System, PEW (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/articles/2019/11/19/louisiana-continues-efforts-to-protect-public-safety-and-reform-justice-system. 
 49. Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 783 (2008). 
50. Id.
 51. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2 (A)(1) (3) (2018). 
 52. Quinton Chandler, Prosecutors and Court Officials Disagree on Reason for Downturn in Drug Court 
Participation, ST. IMPACT OKLA. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2019/01/10/prosecutors-
and-court-officials-disagree-on-reason-for-downturn-in-drug-court-participation/. 
 53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 471.2(A)(2). 
    54.   Often defendants face numerous counts, some of which could be felonies and others of which could be 
misdemeanors. If the charge with the longest potential sentence is considered violent by Oklahoma statute, it is 
the controlling charge. 
 55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 471.2. 
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defendants out of drug court whose violent tendencies are a reflection of their addiction. 
Those defendants are not given the option to avoid prison, thus contributing to the growth 
III.  INTERPRETING OKLAHOMA S DRUG COURT STATUTE IN LIGHT OF SQ780
Statutory interpretation requires divining the intent of the lawmaker, but when 
interpreting ballot initiatives, the lawmaker is the voter.57 Determining voter intent has 
long vexed courts and scholars.58 This section provides an overview of three scholarly 
theories for interpreting ballot initiatives, which yield three potential statutory 
interpretations for the inconsistency created by SQ780: (1) SQ780 and the drug court 
statute can coexist but the number of eligible defendants will continue to shrink, (2) SQ780 
implicitly repeals the drug court statute, and (3) the drug court statute must be amended to 
A. Courts and the Legislature Must Interpret the Voters’ Intent When Reading SQ780 
and Its Interplay with Other Statutes 
Typically, courts and legislators must employ many different methods, or canons, in 
order to interpret statutes.59
be i 60 Another 
61 Yet, these canons of statutory construction 
offer little support in determining whether the Oklahoma Drug Court statute or SQ780 
governs because the laws are not directly adverse to each other, and voters rather than 
legislators enacted SQ780. Each of these canons are intended to interpret statutes, not 
ballot initiatives. Legislators and legislative counsels, who have had legal or legislative 
training, write statutes. These canons do not necessarily apply to ballot initiatives, which 
are drafted by small special interest groups and passed into law by voters lay people who 
often hold no understanding of how laws fit together.62
Since the lawmakers  intent is what drives statutory interpretation, the voter 
becomes the lawmaker when interpreting ballot initiatives.63 In a study examining fifty-
three cases where judges interpreted ballot initiatives, the majority of judges stated that 
64 In 
general, ballot initiatives are disfavored among courts and legislators because the intent is 
difficult to discern. The public is often under- or misinformed, and ballot initiatives can 
                                                          
 57. Stephen H. Sutro, Interpretation of Initiatives by Similar Statutes: Canons of Construction Do Not 
Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945, 946 (1994). 
 58. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 
YALE L.J. 107, 127 (1995). 
 59. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARDNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 247 
(2012). 
60. Id.
61. Id. at 180. 
 62. Sutro, supra note 57, at 945. 
63. Id. at 946. 
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create inconsistencies in the law.65 To remedy the issue created by SQ780, it is helpful to 
understand the three prominent models of scholarship that have analyzed methods for 
interpreting ballot initiatives: the Schacter Model, the Frickey Model, and the Gilbert 
Model. 
B. Applying the Schacter Model of Ballot Initiative Interpretation66
In 1995, Jane Schacter, a statutory interpretation scholar at Yale, was one of the first 
scholars to tackle the statutory interpretation of modern ballot initiatives. Her model is 
only narrowly applicable.67
ballot initiatives are highly likely to create issues of federal constitutionality and (2) that 
these same ballot initiatives lend themselves to extensive problems with statutory 
interpretation. Since Schacter is a recognized authority in statutory interpretation, she 
focuses her analysis on interpreting ballot initiatives and reconciling them with current 
laws.68
Schacter urges courts to apply a specialized set of statutory interpretation guidelines 
specifically for ballot initiatives. She believes part of the problem with ballot initiatives is 
the lack of deliberation, which would allow the public to see both sides of any given 
initiative clearly. Additionally, lack of deliberation robs courts of information, which 
could be integral to determining the meaning of an ambiguous term in a ballot initiative.69
 proposed solution asks courts to initiate interpretive litigation when there is a 
challenge to a ballot initiative, allowing applications for intervention and amicus curiae
participation by interested and potentially unorganized parties. Interpretive litigation 
happens most often when a ballot initiative is passed, but opposition groups gather enough 
signatures on a petition to get an injunction against the initiative. A court intervening at 
the injunctive phase allows it to ferret out interpretive issues with the measure. Interpretive 
litigation allows the court to see potential problematic language and other issues that 
lawyers could bring forward should the initiative become law and later be litigated.70
Another issue Schacter highlights is the potential for abuse of the ballot initiative 
process by special interest groups who can play on the biases of the populous to create 
problematic and discriminatory laws.71 Schacter advocates for a narrow construction to be 
72 She warns against ambiguous language, stating that many ballot initiatives are 
coded with racial language and can have disproportionate impacts on minorities.73
                                                          
65. Id. at 127. 
66. Id.
 67. Michael D. Gilbert, Interpreting Initiatives, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1621, 1629 (2013) (stating 
model only applies when initiative petitions are long, confusing, full of jargon, and potentially harmful to 
marginalized groups). 
 68. Schacter, supra note 58, at 109. 
69. Id. at 155. 
70. Id. at 156. 
71. Id. at 109 n.5. 
72. Id. at 160. 
 73. Considering the time in which Schacter was writing a time of Tough on Crime  rhetoric when 
California aired strongly worded television commercials attempting to pass criminal law amendments via voter 
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Schacter instructs courts to interpret language that implicitly targets socially marginalized 
groups extremely narrowly, if at all. For example, voters passed a 
Amendment 2 74 The measure sought to 
repeal all gay rights ordinances in Colorado and also prevented the state from passing new 
gay rights ordinances. The measure passed with 53.2% of the vote but was later struck 
down by the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans.75
courts to essentially ignore Amendment 2 because of its discriminatory intent and its 
violation of the equal protection clause.76
Schacter proposes the following tests for ballot initiative interpretation: First, allow 
. Second, interpret any 
language that is intended to negatively impact historically disadvantaged groups and 
protected classes extremely narrowly, if the court feels it should be given any weight at 
all. Intentionally discriminatory ballot measures
would likely be federally unconstitutional, so  tests apply to those initiatives that 
are deemed constitutional.77
ability because few voter initiatives would be 
ruled constitutional that contain the intentionally discriminatory language she cautions 
against. However, if 
interpreting those measures. 
Sch
between SQ780 and the drug court statute. SQ780 and Okla
indirectly in opposition with each other and require judicial interpretation. The two laws 
do not reference each other and SQ780 makes no mention of repealing or amending the 
drug court statute.78 However, there is a derivative impact on the drug court statute 
because SQ780 amends the drug possession statute. The drug possession statute previously 
outlined drug possession as a felony.79 Therefore, when SQ780 declassified drug 
possession to a misdemeanor, the impact had a derivative effect on the drug court statute.80
ballot initiative because her goal is largely to limit the interpretation of voter-driven law. 
Since the issue here is that two laws stand in opposition one voter-driven and one 
legislature-driven Schacter would urge courts to narrowly apply the ballot initiative to 
pre-existing laws.81 However, Schacter focuses heavily on the idea that ballot initiatives 
can hurt minorities who do not have money and access to special interest groups that draft 
                                                          
 74. Colorado voters adopted by statewide referendum Amendment 2  to the State Constitution, which 
precludes all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect 
the status of persons based on their homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996). 
75. Id. at 635 36. 
 76. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. 
 77. Just the Facts: Proposition 8, PUB. POL Y INST. OF CAL. (Dec. 2008), 
https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_Prop8JTF.pdf. 
 78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1 71.3 (2014). 
 79. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401 (1999). 
80. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1 71.3 (2014) and SQ 780, supra at note 3, to infer 
incompatibility. 
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state questions. 
When looking at the intent behind SQ780, there is no evidence that the ballot 
initiative will negatively impact minorities in fact, the outcome is likely the opposite. 
For instance, minorities are more likely to be negatively impacted by drug felonies, and 
also more likely to be negatively affected by having a felony on their record.82 The 
imprisonment rate for black individuals in Oklahoma is 2,625 per 100,000 as compared to 
whites at 580 per 100,000 and Hispanics at 530 per 100,000.83 Thus, eliminating the felony 
for drug possession will ultimately help minority defendants. In addition, the types of 
amendments prescribed in SQ780 are not the type to invite litigation in the ways that 
Schacter characterizes.84 Many of the ballot initiatives she references are related to civil 
rights and, thus, vulnerable to litigation. Amending criminal statutes, as SQ780 does, is 
not likely to invite civil rights litigation because criminal statutes are facially neutral. 
criminal statute, those citizens would sue under civil rights laws, not the criminal statutes 
themselves.85 es little to resolve the 
inconsistency created by SQ780. 
C. Applying the Frickey Model of Ballot Initiative Interpretation86
Phillip P. Frickey was a constitutional and statutory interpretation scholar and 
professor of law at the University of Minnesota Law School before moving to Berkeley 
School of Law. Frickey believed that statutory interpretation of ballot initiatives should 
87 Frickey 
 was called into question. 
These types of initiatives are better left to litigation. However, when the issues surrounding 
circumstances not clearly encompassed within the 
traditional canons of statutory interpretation are sufficient to deal with the 
inconsistencies.88 Frickey believes that the traditional canons of statutory interpretation 
are implemented with the goals of deferring to the public and placing a high responsibility 
on the drafters (usually privately funded lobbying groups89)
                                                          
 82. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 12. 
 83. State-by-State Data: Oklahoma, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2017), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts/#map (last visisted Nov. 1, 2018). 
 84. Most notable was California s Ballot Proposition 184, which passed in 1994. The so-called Three 
Strikes  law allowed repeat felony offenders to get life in prison after their third felony conviction, even if the 
offenses were non-violent. This proposition drove a lot of due process litigation in the state. See generally Samuel 
H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California’s Three Strikes Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483 
(2002). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 86. Phillip Frickey, Interpretations on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons and Direct Democracy, 1996 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 478 (1996). 
87. Id. at 521. 
88. Id. at 522. 
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90
Frickey institutes a three-part test for canonical interpretation of ballot measures: 
first, are there constitutional doubts that may be avoided by an alternative interpretation; 
second, when adopted laws are in tension with pre-existing laws, there should be a 
presumption of narrow construction; and third, when a ballot initiative runs up against a 
substantive canon like the rule of lenity, those canons should be applied more strongly 
than they would against a legislative law.91
through the local rules of statu
common law rules of statutory interpretation. While SQ780 was a ballot initiative, 
Therefore, the ballot initiative affected changes to statutes, instead of placing a new law 
statutory interpretation to resolve 
calls for. 
common law rules on statutory interpretation in State v. Stice.92 In Stice, the Cleveland 
County District Attorney motioned for a writ of mandamus against a trial judge who 
refused to order the defendant to pay his district attorney supervision fees. The judge 
maintained it was within his discretion to assess fees and to decide who would receive the 
fees. The district attorney argued that an enacted statute forced the judge to assess fees 
paid directly to the office. In its opinion, the Stice court examines 
Stice quotes extensively from 
State v. Young and Loyoza v. State, which hold that statutes are to be const
determine the intent of the Legislature, reconciling provisions, rendering them consistent 
93 Stice
conflict exists between two statutes, the latter statute controls 94 The interpreter of 
conflicting statutes seems on firm ground when interpreting statutes passed into law by the 
legislature. According to the Frickey model, courts can also be comfortable applying these 
canons of statutory construction to state ballot initiatives.95
construction are clear. Frickey says that when interpreting an initiative that impacts other 
areas of the law (such is the case here) then the canons of construction provide the basis 
                                                          
 90. Frickey, supra note 86, at 522. 
91. Id. at 522 23. 
 92. State ex. rel. Mashburn v. Stice, 288 P.3d 247 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013). 
 93. Id. at 250; see also State v. Young, 989 P.2d 949 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (discussing statutory 
interpretation issue regarding whether money in the Oklahoma State Insurance Fund is public); Loyoza v. State, 
932 P.2d 22, 25 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (  potential conflict between provisions in the 
Delayed Sentencing Program for Young Adults (Sections 996 through 996.3 of Title 22) and the Trafficking in 
Illegal Drugs Act (Sections 2 414 through 2 420 of Title 63) ). 
 94. Stice, 288 P.3d at 250. See City of Sand Springs v. Dep t of Pub. Welfare, 608 P.2d 1139, 1151 (Okla. 
1980); Pickett v. Okla. Dep t of Human Servs., 932 P.2d 543, 545 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996); Taylor v. State, 640 
P.2d 554, 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). 
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through which to interpret.96 The interpretation under Frickey would then be to apply 
State v. Stice to the inconsistency 
created between the drug court statute and SQ780.97 The Stice court states that where two 
98
However, if the two statutes conflict, then the statute that was enacted later controls.99
There are then two possible in
coexist, but this would yield a much smaller number of eligible drug court participants; 
second, the statutes are irreconcilable and the later statute SQ780 controls.100 If the 
first option applied, lawmakers would do nothing about the problem. If the second option 
applied, it would implicitly repeal the drug court statute. 
a. Policy Outcomes of Doing Nothing 
Doing nothing is always an attractive option in law and policy making.101 In many 
cases, constituents are not aware of a problem with the measure they passed, and thus law-
makers can leave inconsistencies on the books that are created by ballot initiatives. Doing 
nothing leaves voters free to think they made a positive difference when there are 
underlying legal issues standing in the way of proper implementation. In this case, because 
the statutes are not directly adverse but rather derivatively impacted, it would be simple 
for lawmakers to do nothing. However, lawmakers have actively sought to limit the impact 
102 In 2017, the Oklahoma legislature put forward 
a bill to nullify the effects of SQ780, believing that voters did not know what they were 
doing when they passed the initiative.103 This follows a large trend of legislators 
attempting to reverse the will of the people in any way they can.104 Doing nothing is 
                                                          
96. Id. at 500. 
97. Id.
98. Stice, 288 P.3d at 251. 
99. Id. at 249 50. 
100. Id.; see Frickey, supra note 86, at 524 (an example of how to apply the model when there are conflicting 
laws but both laws must coexist); id. at 517 (discussing utilizing the quasi-constitutional canons of construction 
in circumstances of implicit repeal). 
101. See generally Lauren French, Congress Setting New Bar for Doing Nothing, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/congress-supreme-court-budget-do-nothing-221057; Kellie Mejdrich, 
Do Nothing Amendments Give Lawmakers Bragging Opportunity About Successes, ROLL CALL (July 28, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/congress-supreme-court-budget-do-nothing-221057; Susan Milligan, 
The Do-Nothing Congress, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 8, 2014), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/08/the-do-nothing-congress; Darla Slipke, Oklahomans React 
to Legislative Inaction, OKLAHOMAN (Nov. 9, 2017), https://newsok.com/article/5571467/oklahomans-react-to-
legislative-inaction. 
 102. Republican legislators introduced Senate Bill 512, which would have amended SQ 780 to make 
possession of any Schedule I and II drugs (except marijuana) a felony punishable by a fine [sic] up to 
imprisonment of five years and a $5000 fine. House Bill 1482 would have expressly overruled 780 s elimination 
of sentence enhancements for repeat drug possession offenders, and effectively overruled SQ 780 for much of 
the state by reclassifying possession of a controlled dangerous substance within 1000 feet of [a] school, church, 
or public park as a felony. Both of these bills raised public outcry and died in committee, and at present there is 
no talk of resurrecting either measure.  Stephen Galoob, Colleen McCarty, & Ryan Gentzler, SQ780: Reform 
and Resistance, 31 FED. SENT G REP. 182, 182 (2019) (internal footnotes omitted). 
  103.  S.B. 512, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017); More recently, the Oklahoma Senate passed SB1674, which 
makes possession of a controlled drug within 1000 feet of a school a felony again. See S.B. 1674, 57th Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2020). 
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preferable to rolling back the state questions passed by voters. 
The results of doing nothing are evident in the policies and practices, which have 
continued for two years since the passage of SQ780. County drug courts are continuing 
along; however they have experienced a large downturn in admissions since SQ780 went 
into effect (See Figure 1). In 2017, Tulsa and Oklahoma counties reported stagnant or 
growing admissions to drug court as compared to previous years. In 2018, the year SQ780 
took effect, these large counties experienced a combined twenty-three percent downturn 
in drug court admissions.105
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Tulsa 
County
138 151 145 153 103 145 167 162 136
Oklahoma 
County
192 176 125 37 64 60 108 179 126
Figure 2106
funding.107 The fewer the participants, the smaller the budget of the drug court program. 
Therefore, if the numbers continue to decrease due to the lack of eligible defendants (since 
they will not have a felony drug charge), then drug court funding will eventually bottom 
out. In addition, leaving the text of these two pieces of law un-reconciled leaves drug court 
programs vulnerable to the whims of elected leaders who can wipe out drug courts as an 
unnecessary expenditure due to the fact that there are no longer drug possession 
felonies.108
b. Policy Outcomes of Implicit Repeal 
Although it may shock many legislators and criminal justice reform advocates, 
implicit repeal of county drug courts could be the first step to establishing a state-wide 
proactive and therapeutic response to drug addiction in the state. County drug courts have 
an extremely variable success rate across the state and are often considered stops on the 
road to incarceration.109 Due to low budgets and variant training of personnel, many 
county drug courts do not follow best practices in treatment of addiction or in 
administering sanctions to participants.110 Further, as a result of poor administration, 
county drug courts can often be a driver of incarceration instead of a remedy as they were 
                                                          
N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/referendum-initiative-legislature-
dakota.html. 
 105. Admissions Data, supra note 6. 
106. Id.
 107. Eric Swanson, Uncertain Future for Drug Courts: State-Funded Program Could Lose Funding Due to 
Budget Crisis, ADA NEWS (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.theadanews.com/news/local_news/uncertain-future-for-
drug-courts-state-funded-program-could-lose/article_d4f583fd-3ac8-537e-883d-3c7ce0b5d2f6.html. 
  108.  SQ780 eliminated felony drug possession, but Possession with Intent to Distribute and Distribution still 
remain felonies. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401 (B)(1). 
  109. Bowers, supra note 49, at 786.
 110. NAT L INST. OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND
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intended.111 Using the money generated by the passage of SQ781, counties could create 
private incentives for companies and private/public partnerships to build programs that 
truly address the root causes of addiction and implement trauma-informed care.112 These 
organizations could focus on prevention, education, and a holistic community response to 
limitations, traditional programs may only operate within the jurisdiction of the court. This 
precludes them from general addiction education, addiction prevention, early intervention, 
and harm reduction strategies that non-profits and free clinics can provide.113
On the other hand, without the drug court statute, courts lose the ability to sentence 
defendants into alternative sentencing drug courts. Without the current framework of the 
drug court statute, courts and counties would be floundering to remake the wheel of 
supervised community sentencing. Many properly indicated defendants would lose the 
chance at rehabilitation and the courts would again be forced to choose between 
incarceration and probation.114 The defendant could tell the court they were going to 
attend a private rehabilitation center, but there would be no compulsory element to their 
sentence. 
There is a net positive of defendants coming out of drug court who are successful.115
Although some are revoked and sent to prison, many do succeed and go on to remain drug 
free. In addition, the voters who passed SQ780 have a largely positive perception of drug 
courts.116 Courts and legislators would likely face a public backlash if they used voter-
driven criminal justice reforms to justify eliminating drug courts. This is true even if the 
replacement were ultimately better in many ways. For these reasons, implicit repeal is 
likely not the best option for reconciling SQ780 and the drug court statute. A more ideal 
solution would be to tweak the current system to more closely alig
This discrepancy in the laws is an opportunity to implement needed law changes to 
improve the current system. 
                                                          
 111. Bowers, supra note 49, at 786. 
 112. SQ781 authorizes Oklahoma Management and Enterprise Services (OMES) to calculate savings from 
those defendants that were deferred from prison into a fund called the Community Safety Investment Fund.
OMES created rules and regulations for how to apply for any money in the fund. The responsibility of creating 
proposals and applying rests on DAs offices. 35 OKLA. REG. 1349 (Sept. 4, 2018). In July 2018, OMES calculated 
that in the first year of implementation, SQ780 generated $63 million in savings to the state. This number was 
widely criticized as flawed and overblown. The first disbursement of the fund will occur at the end of Fiscal Year 
2018 by the legislature and will likely be less than the $63 Million suggested by OMES. Ryan Gentzler, The 
Official SQ780 Savings Calculation Rests on Flawed Assumptions, OKLA. POL Y INST. (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://okpolicy.org/the-official-sq-780-savings-calculation-rests-on-flawed-assumptions/. 
 113. A good example of a non-profit model to address addiction is Shatterproof. The organization focuses on 
public education, free resources, advocacy, and lobbying. Shatterproof s Task Force is dedicated to ensuring 
medical best practices are aligned with addiction treatment across the country. In addition, Shatterproof provides 
funding to private addiction treatment centers that follow a public health, medical science model of addiction 
treatment. SHATTERPROOF, https://shatterproof.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
 114. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 772. 
 115. Oklahoma Drug Courts One Pager, OKLA. DEP T OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS.
(2016), https://ok.gov/odmhsas/documents/2017%20Dc%20One%20Pager.pdf. 
 116. The Oklahoman Editorial Board, Bottom Line on Oklahoma Drug Courts: They Work, OKLAHOMAN (July 
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D. Applying the Gilbert Model of Ballot Initiative Interpretation117
Michael D. Gilbert is a law professor at the University of Virginia School of Law 
focusing on election law, legislation, and constitutional entrenchment. The Gilbert Model 
is the most modern model of ballot initiative interpretation examined in this Comment. 
Gilbert relies heavily on the ideal of the median voter. Unlike Schacter and Frickey, Gilbert 
the concept that a majority of the population has 
the right to make decisions that affect society.118 While Schacter and Frickey seek to limit 
the power of the majority, Gilbert embraces it. He states that the median voter is most 
[,] . . . the proposal that would defeat all other 
proposals in a head-to- 119
In support of this work, Gilbert argues that, many times, a product of legislative 
democracy is bargain democracy a kind of tit-for-tat voting that trades policy-making 
objectives among legislators. In bargain democracy, the citizens lose something because 
they are not getting to choose between one policy or the other, they are getting watered 
representation and a lack of action from legislators. In contrast, when voters get a chance 
to choose what they want, the majority rules, and there can be no question of whether the 
ballot initiative they voted for is the Condorcet winner. Because elected judges answer to 
the same electo
they are acting legalistically even though they may be criticized for pandering to their voter 
base.
In 
discerning voter intent, courts must only ask one question among plausible 
interpretations, which one would the voters who voted on the initiative have preferred to 
120 However, Gilbert also states that considering the median voter means 
taking into account the voters that opposed the measure and their intentions.121 In this 
way, Gilbert advocates for some restriction on the interpretation of ballot measures, though 
not as strongly as Schacter and Frickey. 
pretation yields a much different result than 
requires a deeper understanding of the median voter theorem. The median voter theorem 
is an economic theory that has led to many modern political prediction tools and other 
prominent theories in our society, such as Game Theory.122 The basic principle in the 
median voter theorem is that a majoritarian system will reflect the most preferred will of 
                                                          
 117. See generally Gilbert, supra note 67. 
 118. Nicholas Capaldi, Majoritarianism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/majoritarianism (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 
 119. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1634.  
 120. Id. at 1639. 
  121.   Id. at 1623.
 122. 
Competition. Examining the multitudinous ways this article has shaped society is outside the scope of this article. 





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 100 Side A      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
MCCARTY, C - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2020 4:11 PM 
2020] WHEN VOTERS’ INTENT BACKFIRES 553 
the median voter the voter with the most moderate understanding of the ballot measure 
as it was written.123
Using SQ780 and SQ781 as an example will help to explain the median voter theory. 
These initiatives were passed during the 2016 presidential election. Fifty eight percent of 
voters passed the initiatives. The text of the ballot initiative read: 
This measure amends statutes to reform criminal sentences for certain property and drug 
offenses. It makes certain property offenses misdemeanors. It makes simple drug possession 
a misdemeanor. Property offenses where the value of the property is one thousand dollars or 
more remain felonies, and the distribution, possession with intent to distribute, transportation 
with intent to distribute, manufacture, or trafficking of drugs remain felonies.124
Keeping the text of the measure in mind, assume there were five voters that voted on 
SQ780. Assume all five of them are concerned about excessive state government spending 
and over-incarceration. Voter A felt the measure did not go far enough, and that more 
property crimes and more drug crimes should be declassified, but still voted yes. Voter B 
believed that the measure was too conservative and that more property crimes should be 
declassified, but agreed with the drug crime declassification, so voted yes. Voter C agreed 
with the measure as written, and so voted yes. Voter D found the measure too liberal, 
believing that possessing drugs should be a misdemeanor but that the property crimes 
should not be declassified, so voted no. Voter E voted no because she believed the measure 
was too liberal and that the property crimes and drug crimes should stay as they are. In this 
example, Voter C is the median voter who reflects the will of the majority.125 Using 
gislators should interpret SQ780 to reflect the intentions of 
Voter C. 
Understanding the intentions of Voter C is extremely cultural and fact dependent. 
Discerning the intentions of Voter C requires a deeper understanding of the election 
landscape in Oklahoma in 2016. SQ780 was passed by fifty-eight percent of the voting 
block during the November 2016 general election.126 Oklahoma is traditionally a very 
Republican state: The state voted 65.32% for Donald Trump, and 67.74% for James 
Lankford, Republican Senate candidate.127 Only eleven democratic candidates for State 
House were elected out of seventy-three State House districts.128 This is indicative of a 
high number of voters utilizing straight party voting, which allows voters to check one 
box Democrat or Republican
ballot. Straight party voting is not applicable to State Questions, so voters must 
129 Thus, straight party voting cannot be 
                                                          
 123. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1645. 
 124. SQ780, supra note 3. 
 125. This hypo is a variant of the example in Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1647. 
 126. Official Results: Federal, State, Legislative and Judicial Races General Election – November 8, 2016,
OKLA. ELECTION BD. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.ok.gov/elections/support/20161108_seb.html. 
127. Id.
128. Id.
 129. Straight ticket voting allows voters to fill in Republican, Democrat,  or Independent  once at the top 
of their ballot, and that selection will carry throughout the ballot. Since State Questions and Referendums are 
answered on a Yes/No  basis, straight ticket voting does not apply to those parts of the ballot, and voters must 
make a manual selection for each of the questions, usually at the end of the ballot. Straight Ticket Voting,
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used to explain the passage of any state question. During the same election, voters 
approved a legislative referendum, State Question 776, which allowed the legislature to 
designate any method of execution and reaffirmed that the death penalty is not cruel and 
unusual punishment.130 With such a strong conservative base, the passage of SQ780 was 
unexpected. The most likely explanation is the cost savings and government spending 
reduction likely to come out of the implementation of SQ780,131 as well as the number of 
every day Oklahomans that battle with or are touched by addiction.132 All of these factors 
Gilbert also discusses the importance of considering opinion polls when determining 
is not a perfect measure because some who are 
polled do not vote, but that polls can be a helpful tool for reflecting the true majority 
[p]oll respondents may be more representative of society than 
the subset of voters who voted on the initiative, and pollsters could . . . frame issues more 
133 In the case of SQ780 and SQ781, some opinion polls 
have been conducted regarding criminal justice reforms in Oklahoma as recently as 2018. 
A November 4, 2018 poll showed that seventy-two percent of Oklahomans believed that 
-four 
percent of republicans and seventy-five percent of democrats believed it was very 
important to reduce the number of people in prisons and jails.134 Using poll information 
models because where Schacter and Frickey seek to limit the power of the majority, Gilbert 
seeks to embrace it.135
require legislators to amend the current drug court statute to ensure that it complements 
SQ780 in a way that reduces incarceration and provides meaningful and effective 
treatment for addict populations. 
The current administration of the drug court statute allows district attorneys sole 
discretion to admit defendants who have eligible felonies. Several types of felonies are 
considered admissible to drug courts such as receipt of stolen property, false personation, 
grand larceny, possession with intent to distribute, along with several more. The 
controlling charge does not have to be drug related in order for a district attorney to offer 
a defendant drug court. However, one managing Tulsa County district attorney has 
questioned whether 136
                                                          
 130. State Question No. 776, Initiative Petition No. 367 (as proposed by Okla. Sec y of State, Apr. 13, 2015), 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/776.pdf. 
 131. Ryan Gentzler, SQ780 Should Save Oklahoma Millions Next Year, OKLA. POL Y INST., (June 14, 2017), 
https://okpolicy.org/sq-780-save-oklahoma-millions-next-year/. 
 132. Oklahomans have the highest rate of non-medical pain pill use in the nation at 8.1%, twice the national 
average. OKLA. DEP T OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS., STATE OF ADDICTION: A SERIES OF 
STORIES FROM THE OKLAHOMAN, TULSA WORLD, OKLAHOMA WATCH, STATE IMPACT OKLAHOMA, OETA
KWTV-9, AND KGOU 4 (2010), http://www.odmhsas.org/stateofaddictionc%20(2).pdf. 
 133. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1650. 
 134. Strong Bi-Partisan Support for Ambitious Criminal Justice Reforms in Oklahoma, FWD.US (Nov. 4, 
2018), https://www.fwd.us/news/ok-poll-memo/. 
 135. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1621. 
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Historically, district attorneys preferred to admit defendants with felony possession 
charges to drug court. However, SQ780 removed that option. If district attorneys continue 
to restrict drug court admissions to first-time felons with low-level drug-related crimes, 
then drug court will become unsustainable because those felonies no longer exist. The 
 district attorney framework for 
admitting defendants to drug court
treatment and reduce the number of addicts in prison, district attorneys seek to limit access 
to drug court on moral grounds. 
reduce 
government spending on incarceration, and provide a more compassionate response to 
addiction-driven crime. The prospect of doing nothing and allowing the drug court statute 
to remain in conflict with the changes created by SQ780 runs counter to those intentions 
-mandated 
drug treatment program, thus taking away one vehicle for delivering a compassionate 
response to addiction. In addition, doing nothing does not meaningfully reduce the prison 
population or prison spending because some defendants in drug court still go to prison, 
and drug court has existed for eighteen years without creating a meaningful reduction in 
the prison population. Allowing SQ780 to implicitly repeal the drug court statute could 
allow practitioners and experts to create a whole new infrastructure for how the Oklahoma 
criminal justice system handles addiction, however this is an unlikely interpretation 
because lawmakers and courts would inflame the public by using SQ780 as a justification 
for eliminating drug courts. 
begs the question: what amendments to the drug court statute would reduce government 
spending on incarceration, reduce prison overcrowding, and provide a compassionate 
response to addiction based crimes? 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DRUG COURT STATUTE
Intellectually, interpreting the inconsistency created by SQ780 seems manageable. 
However, when put into practice, each of the interpretations would lead to vastly different 
policy outcomes that could have negative impacts across the state. Doing nothing and 
allowing the statutes to remain as they are could bottom out drug court funding due to the 
continuing downturn in eligible defendants. Implicitly repealing the drug court statute may 
be attractive to those who would like to start over with a more preventative and holistic 
approach to treating addicts in the system. However, in reality it would potentially end a 
program that is the most successful alternative thus far in treating addicts in the system.137
                                                          
drug courts are those arrested for more serious nonviolent crimes like intent to sell drugs or felony burglary. Is 
that the sort of person who deserves drug court?  Grayless asked.  Chandler, supra note 52. 
 137. THE SECOND DECADE, supra note 110, at iii ( Research indicates that drug courts can reduce recidivism 
and promote other positive outcomes. However, research has not uncovered which court processes affect which 
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In addition, the funds from SQ781 intended to provide preventative community drug 
treatment are being funneled through district attorneys offices. Therefore, implicit repeal 
would leave the state with no infrastructure, no funds, and a treatment fund with no river 
to flow into.138 Amending the drug court statute to reflect the intent of the voters is the 
most realistic and beneficial interpretation. 
A. Remove District Attorney as Gatekeeper 
There are several ways to amend the drug court statute to create a policy landscape 
more in tune with the vo
to remove district attorneys as drug court gatekeepers and place that responsibility with 
the court. The drug court statute currently mandates that district attorneys are the sole body 
that can recommend an offender for drug court.139
Evidence for this recommendation can be found in two privately-funded court 
alternatives run in Tulsa County: Women in Recovery and First Step Male Diversion 
Program. Both of these privately-funded, non-profit programs require the judge to make 
the ultimate decision on whether or not the offender gets sentenced into the program.140
The district attorney still maintains control of the charge and can make recommendations 
as to whether or not the judge should admit the defendant to the program, but ultimately 
the court decides who is admitted.141 This takes the admission control from the district 
attorneys, who historically shy away from alternative courts for offenders that do not fit a 
typical addict profile, and yet still suffer from addictions that are the root of their crimes.142
Women in Recovery participants often have a more diverse criminal history than those 
traditionally put into drug court, and have a higher success rate.143 Officials at the program 
pinpoint this success to a close working relationship with the judges who recommend 
defendants for admittance. In addition, the Women in Recovery program closely monitors 
the ORAS scores144 (the diagnostic assessment used to gauge criminality and likelihood 
                                                          
 138. 35 OKLA. REG. 1349 (Sept. 4, 2018). 
 139. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2 (B) (2014). 
  140.  Women in Recovery participants can enter a blind plea. After the plea is entered, the judge sentences the 
participant to Women in Recovery as an alternative sentencing program. Tracy LeGrand, Women in Recovery 
Supported, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.tulsaworld.com/archive/women-in-recovery-
supported/article_e1fde645-41dd-5394-a476-5ca67a5af130.html. 
  141.  Id. 
 142. A typical drug court defendant has crimes that solely reflect addiction: Possession of a Controlled Drug, 
being the most popular drug court crime. Since possession is now a misdemeanor in Oklahoma, this is no longer 
available and District Attorneys must look to other crimes that are indicative of addiction. Some of those could 
include: possession with intent to distribute, burglary, false personation, child endangerment, unauthorized use 
of a motor vehicle, etc. The inquiry should always be fact dependent. District attorneys have expressed chagrin 
at these types of defendants receiving the chance at drug court. Chandler, supra note 52. 
 143. Stetson Payne, Women in Recovery Celebrates 25th Graduating Class to Help Break Cycle of Addiction 
for Families, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 9, 2018) https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/women-in-recovery-
celebrates-th-graduating-class-to-help-break/article_611f05c9-7e09-5e61-91e4-5eeb388e5840.html. 
 144. The Ohio Risk Assessment System is an empirically researched and validated tool for discerning criminal 
risk factors. The tool was developed to classify the risk level of offenders in the system while also identifying 
both criminogenic needs and barriers to programming.  EDWARD LATESSA ET AL., CREATION AND VALIDATION 
OF THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM FINAL REPORT 6 (July 2009), 
https://www.ocjs.ohio.gov/ORAS_FinalReport.pdf. The ORAS tool is widely used in criminal justice systems 
across America to assess needs and risks of criminal defendants or inmates who may be reentering society 
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of recidivism) of its participants and only admits those who have a high chance of success. 
District attorneys can take the ORAS scores into account when determining sentencing, 
but more often district attorneys use the type of crime to make decisions about alternative 
sentences. Often, defendants with ORAS scores that indicate they could be successful in 
drug court are not offered the chance to enter drug court even when the statute would 
allow it because their crimes are deemed too serious to be allowed the chance at 
rehabilitation outside of prison.145
While this solution may increase the workload on the judiciary, especially in small 
counties with few judges, the workload would not increase by a large amount. Currently 
judges must still adjudicate defendants in drug court, however they have no say in who is 
accepted or rejected into the programs. Giving the gatekeeping function to the judge would 
allow the judge to do a fact-
adjudication. There is a concern that in small counties where judges and district attorneys 
work closely together that the judge would simply follow all the same recommendations 
that the district attorneys make as far as which defendants get the chance at drug court. 
However, the largest impact would occur in the most populous counties Tulsa County 
and Oklahoma County where judges and district attorneys frequently disagree and there 
is less trepidation about a negative impact to their working relationships. 
Removing the district attorneys as gatekeepers to drug court is aligned with the 
-mentioned private programs 
maintain, more defendants will be approved for drug court if the judge is in control of 
admissions. This would reflect the 
incarceration because the judge is more likely to follow the ORAS score recommendation. 
Second, removing the district attorney as gatekeeper allows the system to deliver 
compassionate addiction treatment to those defendants who would otherwise go directly 
into the prison system. Third, it reduces government spending on incarceration and 
adjudication because an individual costs the state $5,000 per year in drug court as opposed 
to $19,000 per year in prison.146
B. Remove the Prior Violent Felony Restriction and the Current Violent Felony 
Restriction 
conviction in this state or another state for a violent offense within the last ten (10) 
147 and also states that the current crime the defendant is being charged with must 
be non-
current law, the twenty-two eighty-five percent crimes are labeled as violent.148
Additionally, anyone to whom conspiracy liability attaches can also be charged with a 
violent felony. This means that an accomplice who sits in the getaway car of a robbery 
                                                          
 145. Chandler, supra note 52. 
 146. Adult Drug Court, OKLA. DEP T OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS.,
https://ok.gov/odmhsas/Substance_Abuse/Oklahoma_Drug_and_Mental_Health_Courts/Adult_Drug_Court/ind
ex.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
 147. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2(2) (2014). 
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will be charged with a violent felony if the robbery is attempted or completed with a 
weapon. Many defendants are charged with violent felonies yet present no violent 
tendencies. It is these complexities in Oklahoma law that make sentencing and restrictions 
on rehabilitative treatment extremely punitive. 
Allowing the court to be the gatekeeper of drug court, in addition to adding a neutral 
body to the process, will also allow judges to perform a balancing test in regard to prior 
when deciding whether or not they should preclude drug 
court admission. This balancing test should consider what type of crime the defendant is 
held on, whether or not the defendant has a violent history, a history of mental health 
issues, 
felony charge. If the defendant is indeed exhibiting violent outbursts, has a history of 
harming others, and his/her ORAS score does not indicate the defendant will be successful 
in drug court, then the court should take the steps to refuse drug court admission. However, 
allowing this analytical step to be taken by the court is an important first step to ensure 
Oklahoma is not excluding candidates from drug court who would benefit from and 
succeed in an alternative sentencing drug court. 
There are other sociological problems with the prior felony restriction. A recent 
study by a University of Georgia sociologist found that while eight percent of the overall 
United States population has a prior felony conviction, thirty-three percent of African 
American males have a felony conviction.149 This disproportionality impacts any system 
that limits access based on prior felony convictions. The Oklahoma drug court statute 
limits admission to those individuals who have no prior violent felony convictions in the 
past ten years.150 This restriction enables district attorneys to limit access to treatment to 
first time drug offenders. However, this limitation creates flawed results. Those defendants 
with one or several prior felony convictions could have ORAS scores that indicate they 
would be successful in drug court. In addition, their underlying addiction could be a root 
cause of the behavior that led to their prior convictions. Rehabilitating the addiction can 
Nationally, states spend $200 to $600 per adjudication of a robbery defendant, and 
$200 to $800 per adjudication of a larceny defendant.151 The cost to the state taxpayer 
increases exponentially when a defendant is sentenced to prison. Therefore, multitudinous 
resources are spent on those defendants who have multiple felony convictions. Allowing 
a prior felon access to an alternative sentencing drug court would racially equalize drug 
court participants as well as reduce state spending on adjudication and incarceration. 
District attorneys employ a retributivist view of drug court that is largely based on 
moral concerns. They fear that those defendants who have multiple felony convictions are 
too far gone for rehabilitation. The logic is that those defendants went to prison, which 
                                                          
 149. Sarah Shannon, et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony Records in the 
United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 22 23 (Sept. 2017); see also Alan Flurry, Study Estimates U.S. 
Population with Felony Convictions, UGA TODAY (Oct. 1 2017), https://news.uga.edu/total-us-population-with-
felony-convictions/. 
  150.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2(A)(2).
 151. Priscilla Hunt, The Price of Justice: New National and State Level Estimates of the Judicial and Legal 





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 103 Side A      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
MCCARTY, C - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2020 4:11 PM 
2020] WHEN VOTERS’ INTENT BACKFIRES 559 
was meant to rehabilitate them, and the rehabilitation was ineffective.152 However, 
research shows that prison is ineffective for rehabilitation and frequently causes an 
increase in criminality when defendants are released.153 Thus, individual defendants 
should not be blamed for the ineffectiveness of prison as a rehabilitative intervention and 
thus precluded from treatment options. 
Eliminating the prior felon restriction from the drug court statute is consistent with 
more defendants of greater diversity will be approved for drug court 
if the prior felon/current violent felon restrictions are removed. This would reflect the 
indicated defendants entering drug court means less prison admissions, thus less prison 
spending. Second, removing the prior violent felon/current violent felon restriction allows 
a more racially compassionate system. Equal access to state drug rehabilitation programs 
indicates that all Oklahoma citizens are being offered equal protection of the laws and not 
suffering from systemic discrimination. Third, allowing prior felons a chance to participate 
ice system and allow them 
a chance at true rehabilitation. Even if this theory only partially bears out (i.e. some 
defendants still fail and return to prison) the spending reduction on rehabilitating those 
who revisit the criminal justice system frequently would still create a net reduction in 
government spending. 
C. The Drug Court Statute Should Provide That a Defendant Cannot Be Revoked Solely 
Due to Drug Relapse 
Public and scientific opinion surrounding addiction has changed vastly in the last 
twenty years.154 The concept of addiction and addiction treatment is considered in 
America widely as a public health issue rather than one that should be handled in the 
courts.155 Addiction, also called Substance Use Disorder, is a disease that impacts the 
brain in predictable and pathological ways.156 The criminal justice system has been widely 
criticized for not implementing scientific advances into the way it treats drug addiction.157
                                                          
  152.  Scholars have long endorsed the concept that prosecutors can bring charges as long as they personally, 
morally believe the defendant is guilty. There is no reason not to infer this same personal belief transfers to 
allocation of alternative sentencing pleas. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's 
Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 524 (1993); see also Sarah French Russell, 
Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1146 (2010). 
 153. Serge Brochu et al., Comparative Profiles of Addicted Adult Populations in Rehabilitation and 
Correctional Services, 16 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 173, 173 (1999). 
 154. In the 2017 mid-term primaries, Oklahomans passed SQ788, which made medical Marijuana legal in the 
state. This is interesting, because prior to the passage of SQ780 (just a year previous), possession of Marijuana 
could have led to a decade long prison sentence if the defendant had prior drug crimes. Paul Armentano, Public 
Support for Medical Marijuana Access Is Overwhelming and Bipartisan, HILL (June 30, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/394915-public-support-for-medical-marijuana-access-is-overwhelming-
and-bipartisan; OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 2-402 (B)(3) (4) (2016); State Question No. 788, Initiative Petition No. 
412 (as proposed by Okla. Sec y of State, Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/788.pdf. 
 155. Nora Volkow et al., Drug Use Disorders: Impact of a Public Health Rather than a Criminal Justice 
Approach, 16 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 213, 213 (2017). 
 156. Bruce Goldman, Neuroscience of Need: Understanding the Addicted Mind, 29 STANFORD  MED. MAG.,
no. 1, 2012, at 24. 
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The National Association of Drug Court Professionals provides a list of best 
practices that all drug courts are encouraged to follow.158 One of the most impactful and 
progressive practices provides that defendants should not be revoked from a drug court 
sentence due to a drug relapse.159 Recent addiction and human behavior research suggests 
that relapse is a statistical inevitability when treating addict populations.160 Though 
different drugs have different time periods for predicted relapse some of which include 
months or years the fact is that relapse is an expected and surmountable challenge 
inherent in addiction treatment. 
Under current county drug court rules and regulations, many programs permit 
revocation of a drug court sentence after a defendant gives a drug-positive result on a 
urinalysis test.161 This practice is widely variant across counties. Some drug courts may 
have a zero-tolerance policy for drug use while others may allow a few failed drug tests 
before revoking the sentence. A revocation means the defendant goes to prison to serve a 
sentence they agreed on with the judge should they fail drug court. Thus, revocations drive 
prison population growth. Having revocation policies that are inconsistent with the science 
of addiction is essentially ensuring that defendants will fail the programs and go to prison. 
Legislators, judges, and district attorneys must ensure that the drug court programs 
are administered with the most up-to-date medical knowledge of addiction and the best 
practices for ensuring success. Certainly, there will still be drug court failures. However, 
those failures will not be predicated on a predictable outcome such as relapse. Ignoring 
relapse as a part of recovery is setting defendants up to fail, thus driving high incarceration 
rates. Encoding the inability to revoke sentences due to relapse into the drug court statute 
will ensure uniform practice across the state. 
V.  CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that there is an irreparable inconsistency in the Oklahoma 
drug court statute created by SQ780, a ballot initiative  passed by voters in 2016. The ballot 
initiative declassified drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor. The drug court 
statute requires a felony for admission. This inconsistency has created a vacuum of drug 
programs, which depend on high levels of participation for funding. After examining three 
models of ballot initiative interpretation, this 
in passing SQ780 was to reduce prison populations, reduce government spending on 
prisons, and create a compassionate way of treating addicts in the criminal justice system. 
The best way to achieve these ends is to amend the drug court statute in the following 
ways: remove district attorneys as gatekeepers to drug court admissions and substitute the 
court, remove the prior felony/current violent felon restrictions and employ a balancing 
test for violent felonies so that a violent felony does not preclude entry into drug court, 
                                                          
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/opinion/addiction-relapse-prosecutions.html. 
 158. Drug Courts have significantly poorer outcomes and are considerably less cost-effective when they 
terminate participants for drug or alcohol use.  1 NAT L ASSOC. OF DRUG COURT PROF LS, supra note 35, at 33. 
  159.   Id.
160. Id. at 46. 
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and provide in the statute that defendants cannot have their drug court sentences revoked 
due to addiction-related 
passing SQ780. Amending the drug court statute in these ways will remedy the 
inconsistency in the statutes and create a net reduction in the Oklahoma prison population 
the criminal justice system. 
- Colleen McCarty*
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